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the court's unwillingness to aid an officious intermeddler. One who provides
food for a starving person, thereby performing a duty which should have been
performed by another, is not an officious intermeddler. Hope, Officiousness
(1930) 15 CORN. L. Q. 205, 238. The doctrine of subrogation should be applied
where it will prevent unjust enrichment. Note (1926) 39 HAxv. L. Ray. 381.
The principal case, in addition to holding that the wife's right to reimbursement may be exercised by her guardian if she becomes insane, continues the
husband's obligation of support after the wife is committed to an institution.
On the latter point the authorities are in conflict. In Wisconsin the husband's
duty of support ends when the wife is committed to an asylum, even though
the husband has been instrumental in obtaining such commitment. His duty is
regarded as fully performed if he has not refused to support his wife in the
matrimonial home. Richardson v. Stuesser, 125 Wis. 66, 103 N.W. 26, 69 L.R.A.
829 (1905). In Nebraska it has been held that a husband is subjected to double
taxation if he must support his wife in an insane asylum, and accordingly he has
been held not liable for such support. Baldwin v. Douglas County, 37 Neb. 283,
55 N.W. 875, 20 L.R.A. 850 (1893).
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Torts--Negligence--Degree of Care Required of Operators of Elevators and
Escalators.-The plaintiff alleged that an escalator on which she was riding
in the defendant's store became out of order, vibrated violently, pushed her from
side to side and threw her upon her back, causing injuries. The defendant contended that its duty to the plaintiff was merely that owed to a business guest,
requiring it to keep its premises in a reasonably safe condition. The plaintiff
insisted that the defendant was under a duty to exercise the highest practical
degree of care for the safety of passengers using the store's escalators. Held,
that operators of elevators and escalators are under the same duty as that
which is required of common carriers and must exercise the highest degree
of care for the safety of their passengers. Heffernan v. Mandel Bros. Inc., 297
Ill. App. 272, 17 N.E. (2d) 523 (1938).
The highest degree of care must be exercised by common carriers. They are
liable for the slightest neglect against which human care and foresight might
have guarded. Treadwell v. Whittier, 80 Cal. 574, 22 Pac. 266, 5 L.R.A. 498
(1889); Ferguson v. Truax, 136 Wis. 637, 118 N.W. 251 (1908); Wanzer v.
Chippewa Valley E. R. Co., 108 Wis. 319, 84 N.W. 423 (1900).
The majority of cases hold that the law makes no distinction between an
undertaking to carry passengers in buildings by means of elevators and undertaking to carry them upon streets, highways or railroads. The same obligation
to exercise the highest degree of care and skill applies in each case. Walsh v.
Cullen, 235 Ill. 91, 85 N.E. 223 (1908). This has been required where elevators
have been used in buildings for business purposes, Springer v. Ford, 189 Ill.
430,59 N.E. 953 (1901) ; or for use of tenants in office building, Hartford Deposit
Co. v. Sollitt, 172 Ill. 222, 50 N.E. 178, 64 Am. St. Rep. 35 (1898); or in an
apartment house, Hodges v. Percival, 132 Ill. 53, 23 N.E. 423 (1890); or in a
department store, Steiskal v. Marshall Field & Co., 238 Ill. 32, 87 N.E. 117
(1908). Wisconsin requires the highest degree of care that human skill and
foresight could suggest. Dibbert v. Metropolitan Investment Co., 158 Wis. 69,
147 N.W. 3 (1914); Deh'mel v. Smith, 200 Wis. 292, 227 N.W. 274 (1929);
Oberndorfer v. Pabst, 100 Wis. 505, 76 N.W. 338 (1898).
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RECENT DECISIONS

The minority view on the degree of care required in elevator cases is that the
instrumentality must be in a reasonably safe condition for the customer's use.
A New York court reasoned that since buildings have other things just as
dangerous, such as boilers and open hatchways, and only reasonable care is
required for them, no exception should be made with regard to elevators, since
all of the dangerous instrumentalities are within the same building. Griffin v.
Manice, 166 N.Y. 188, 198, 59 N.E. 925, 52 L.R.A. 922, 82 Am. St. Rep. 630
(1901). Other courts have reasoned that an elevator is not, like a common carrier, a servant of the public, but that the relations and duties of an elevator
operator are with a limited number of persons who have contracted with him
for the use of his premises and others who have business with his tenants.
Seaver v. Bradley, 179 Mass. 329, 60 N.E. 795, 88 Am. St. Rep. 384 (1901);
Burgess v. Stowe, 134 Mich. 204, 210, 96 N.W. 29 (1903).
The jurisdictions which require the highest degree of care in the operation
of elevators seem to follow the same rule in regard to escalators, reasoning that
there is no difference in principle between the operation of an elevator and an
escalator. Both are installed for the same purpose and the only difference is
in the method of operation. The elevator runs in a perpendicular fashion and
the escalator at an angle of approximately 45 degrees. Both are intended for
the benefit of customers and to induce the customers to visit the establishment
of the owners, the owners profiting from the installation and operation of each.
McBride v. May Departnent Stores, 124 Ohio St. 264, 178 N.E. 12 (1931);
Petrie v. Kaufman & Baer Co., 291 Pa. 211, 139 Atl. 878 (1927).
Jurisdictions following the minority rule as to elevators apply a like rule as
to escalators, i.e., the operator must use reasonable care to keep in a reasonably
safe condition for customer's use. Richter v. L. Bamberger & Co., 11 N.J. Misc.
229, 165 AtI. 289 (1933). One court reasoned that if the highest degree of care
were required for escalators, there would be in the same building one degree
of care for one mode of elevation and another degree of care for another,
that is, if the plaintiff elected to use the stairs, a degree of care would be
required different from that required if she used the escalator or elevator. The
court could see no reason for these different degrees of care. Stratton v. Newberry Co., 117 Conn. 522, 169 Atl. 56 (1933).
JOSEPH ZILBER

Torts-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Intervention of a Third Party.-Action for damages, arising out of the alleged negligent operation of the defendant's power
plant, was brought by a meat packing company. The plaintiff operated two electric compressors for the manufacture of ice. The electric power, supplied by
the defendant power company, failed. When the current was restored, the
motors of the two compressors began to burn. The preponderance of evidence
indicated that the fire was caused by the delivery, to the electric motors, of a
"1single phase current" rather than a "three phase current." The "single phasing"
was caused by the collision of an automobile with one of the defendant company's poles. The defendant obtained a judgment on a directed verdict.
The plaintiff appealed, claiming that under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
it was entitled to a full and complete explanation of the cause of the fire, but
that no such explanation had been offered. Judgment held, reversed and the cause
remanded for a new trial, but only on the ground that there had been a sufficient
conflict of evidence to prevent a directed verdict. The federal court refused to
apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur because the intervention of a third party

